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Going public is an ample opportunity for expansion and a listed company is 
vested with publicity, privilege and other intangible benefits. Nevertheless, an 
opportunity can be turned into threat when rationality is clouded by the siren of "getting 
big", and while the listed company could hardly stop to think about "How big is big?". 
The glamour upon new flotation finally ends up with ironic woes. 
Stories of listed companies going bust are not uncommon in Hong Kong. The 
tendencies of listed companies plunging into operating losses and financial troubles are 
‘ serious concerns not only for shareholders, creditors and employees, but for statutory 
governance and the well being of the economy as a whole. 
In view of the foregoing, this study aims at exploring the characteristics and 
performance trend of the listed companies which incur accumulated losses in past years. 
Leading cases will also be examined to see how the companies turn opportunities into 
threats, and whether one can turn the threats into opportunities. 
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CHAPTER I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1.1 B a c k g r o u n d 
Going public is an expansionist dream for many entrepreneurs to strive for 
publicity and to enhance operational and financial efficiencies. The significant growth in 
the number ofinitial public offer ("IPO") in Hong Kong in recent years has increased the 
total number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong to over 600 
companies. Nevertheless, the increase in quantity of listed companies does not go along 
with increase in quality. There is an increasing trend of corporate failure of Hong Kong 
listing companies in terms of operating losses and financial difficulties, especially for 
those second to fourth tier companies listed in recent years. This phenomenon is a serious 
issue as corporate failure is not only detrimental to shareholders, creditors and 
employees, it could also bring along domino effects which could ruin the smooth 
functioning of the economy. 
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1 . 2 R e c e n t D e v e l o p m e n t 
Recent performance of Hong Kong listed companies can be summarized along 
two phrases, namely before and after the outburst of recent Asian turmoil: 
B e f o r e A s i a n t u r m o i l in l a t e 1 9 9 7 
Performance of second to fourth tier listed companies in Hong Kong has been 
deteriorating over recent years, with operating losses and financial troubles unveiling one 
after another. Typical examples are Wo Kee Hong (Holdings) Ltd, Asia Commercial 
Holdings Ltd, Swank International Manufacturing Co Ltd and Kosonic International 
Holdings Ltd etc with net losses of over HK$1 billion for a single financial year. What 
has turned these companies from once being a promising IPO to repercussions in years' 
time? In view of the foregoing, attention should be drawn to the operating performance 
trend of these second to fourth tier listed companies, while the potential reasons for their 
failures are valuable signals for common concerns. 
A f t e r m a t h o f A s i a n t u r m o i l i n l a t e 1 9 9 7 
The aftermath of Asian turmoil, together with bearish stock market and sluggish 
property market in Hong Kong, have turned the Hong Kong economy from boom to 
gloom. It has also intensified the inherent problems of many listed companies, which are 
now struggling from operational problems of slashes in turnover, cash flow problems of 
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capital tied up in stock and property markets, as well as financial problems of shrinkage 
in sources of finance, both from equity market and debt market. Just to name a few of 
such recently cash-strapped companies include Joyce Boutique Holdings Ltd, Theme 
International Holdings Ltd, Mansion Holdings Ltd, lnterform Ceramics Technologies Ltd 
and UDL Holdings Ltd etc. One common characteristic of the above-mentioned 
companies is that they have been profit making companies with sudden downturn in a 
year 's time. 
1 . 3 O b j e c t i v e s o f t h i s s t u d y 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
• to evaluate the recent trends of operating losses incurred by second to fourth tier 
listed companies in Hong Kong, and 
參 to study the characteristics of these loss companies along with their operational and 
treasury management, with comparison with their successful counterparts, and 
• to explore the potential causes for their failures, and 
• to examine the remedial measures undertaken by management so as to provide 
guidelines for management, investors and creditors for making economic decisions, 
and 
• to review current economic environment and to identify potential opportunities and 
threats for management's concerns. 
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1 . 4 S c o p e o f S t u d y 
S a m p l e s e l e c t i o n b a s i s 
The scope of this study will be restricted to the second to fourth tier companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong which fall within the 'Industries & 
Commerce Sector，and ‘Property Sector，. Non listed companies are excluded due to 
practical reasons of inadequate published data and relatively less public concerns. Among 
the listed companies, only the above two sectors are selected under the following 
grounds: 
• Companies beyond the scope of study - As the main objective of this study is to 
evaluate the features of the loss making listed companies in recent years, the 
remaining sectors are by definition excluded as they are less susceptible to 
operational troubles for the period under review. Examples are blue chips with stable 
profit trend, Government protected cartels such as banking and utility industries, as 
well as state owned enterprises such as H Share & Red Chips with less exposure to 
operational risk. 
• Comparability - The remaining sectors are not comparable in terms of size (Blue 
chips), specialized industries (Bank & Finance, Utility) and shareholding structure (H 
Shares and Red chips). 
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• Size of population - The above two sectors in aggregate constitute to majority (over 
70%) oflisted companies in Hong Kong. 
B a s i s f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f c o r p o r a t e f a i l u r e 
Corporate failure can be a broad definition including operating losses and 
financial distresses. Empirical study on financial distress will not be covered in this study 
due to lack of unique measurement of the extent of failure. Unlike the measurement of 
annual profit or loss results which is an objective measurement on unique time horizon, 
quantitative comparison of liquidity problem among companies involves the day to day 
liquidity position of listed companies, which is not practicable under existing disclosure 
requirements in Hong Kong, ln substance, detailed and formal published data for 
financial distress cases is not available unless the listed company goes bankrupt, which is 
not common in Hong Kong. This situation is different from the sizable listed companies 
in US countries with remarkable population of bankruptcy cases for listed companies. 
In view of the foregoing, this study will restrict the determination of corporate 
failure to the operating performance of the listed companies, and net loss attributable to 
shareholders ("net loss") will be used as measurement for the company's performance. In 
addition, time horizon of this study will cover the latest three years' results, which is in 
line with the time horizon for evaluating IPO in Hong Kong as mentioned below: 
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Listing Rules in Hong Kong requires a IPO company to fulfill the following two 
criteria: 
:‘ 
P r o f i t T e s t - 3 years' trading record with a minimum net profit attributable to 
shareholders of HK$20 million for the latest year, plus an aggregate net profits 
attributable to shareholders ofHK$30 million for preceding two years, and 
A s s e t T e s t - a minimum market capitalization ofHK$100 million at time oflisting. 
ln accordance with the above listing requirement where a 3 years' time frame is 
considered by Stock Exchange of Hong Kong as an appropriate evaluation of a 
company's qualification for listing, this study will also be based on the listed companies' 
‘ financial results for the latest 3 years. Accordingly, a listed company will be considered 
as failure i f 3 years' accumulated return to shareholder is negative, le. there is net 
accumulated losses for the past 3 financialyears. 
1 . 5 D e f i n i t i o n o f t e r m s 
L o s s c o m p a n y - a company with accumulated net losses for the latest 3 financial years is 
considered as failure and is defined as a "loss company" in this study. 
u 
N e t p r o f i t o r n e t l o s s - Net profit or net loss to be mentioned in this study refers to net 
return attributable to shareholders, which is after tax and minority interests. 
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CHAPTER II 
L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W 
2.1 . S t u d i e s on C o r p o r a t e F a i l u r e 
M e a s u r e m e n t of C o r p o r a t e F a i l u r e 
There has been considerable work done on corporate failure. Altman, Edward I. 
published the Z-score model in 1968 for predicting corporate failure and the model was 
later modified in 1981. In his writing in 1993，Altman, Edward 1] re-emphasized the 
usefulness of this model in assisting operational and financial management. The Z-score 
model is a weighted average measurement of various financial ratios including: Working 
Capital to Total Assets at 12% weighting, Retained Earnings to Total Assets at 14% 
weighting, Earnings before Interest and Tax ("EBIT") to Total Assets at 33% weighting, 
Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Total Debt at 6% weighting and Sales to Total 
Assets at 9.99% weighting. The above weighting demonstrates Altman's perception on 
the relative importance of various ratios where greater emphasis is placed on earnings 
1 Altinan, Edward I.，"Corporate Financial Distress and bankruptcy - A complete guide to predicting & 
avoiding distress and profiting from bankruptcy", a Wiley Finance Edition, 2 ^ Edition, 1993. 
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potential (33% for EBIT/Total Assets) rather than liquidity management (12% for 
working capital to Total Assets). 
A g i n g o f f a i l u r e c o m p a n i e s 
Altman's writing in 1993 also cited a survey on the age of business failures in US 
in 1990. The survey was conducted by Dun & Bradstreet and concluded that 31.4% of all 
failures occurred in a company's first three years with greater propensity to fail for infant 
entity than its older counterparts. 
I m p o r t a n c e o f c a s h f l o w m a n a g e m e n t 
Kharbanda, O.P. and Stallworthy E.A. (1985) undertook another study^ on the 
bankruptcy of Laker Airways, the famous UK airline, in 1982. Kharbanda and 
Stallworthy raised the concern that greater emphasis should be focused on a company's 
cash flow position, rather than conventional accounting profit and loss. In their study, 
Kharbanda and Stallworthy comment on the failure of Laker Airway as : “the danger 
signals were there at least three years earlier, but were ignored The financial gearing 
was quite high, with a debt/equity ratio of 5:1 in 1981” Meanwhile, operating cash flow 
only accounted for 25% of total cash flow for Laker Airways in 1980 with Net 
2 Kharbanda, O.P. and Stallworthy, E.A., "Corporate Failure 一 Prediction, panacea and prevention", 
McGraw-Hill Book Co.(UK) Ltd, 1985. 
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investment accounted for 100% oftotal cash flow. The case o fLaker Airway is a typical 
failure case caused by cash flow management problems. 
2 . 2 S t u d i e s o n c a u s e s a n d i m p a c t s o f C o r p o r a t e F a i l u r e 
M a n a g e m e n t p r o b l e m s 
According to Miles, Raymond E. and Snow, Charles C (1994) ^ critical factors 
for company failure are the inability to respond to environmental changes as well as 
internal organizational problems. Inability to respond to environmental changes was 
caused by managerial stereotype on strategic predisposition and burden of market 
leadership. As regarding internal organizational problems, Miles and Snow pointed out 
the major managerial mistakes as "extension failure" and "modification failure" 
Extension failure occurs when management makes decisions that are logical in separate 
perspective but in the aggregate push the company beyond the limits of its capability. 
Modification failure refers to the case when management makes changes that appear to 
be reasonable but in substance violate the company's operating logic. 
Another study was presented by Argenti, John ( 1 9 7 6 / on the general causes and 
3 Miles, Raymond E. ； Snow, Charles C., "Fit, Failure, and the Hall ofFame - How companies Succeed or 
Fail" The Free Press, 1994. 
4 Argenti, John, "Corporate collapse - Tlie causes and symptoms", McGraw-Hill, 1976. 
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symptoms of corporate failure, including 'one man rule \ 'non-participating board', 
finance function，，'lack of management depth ’，'overriding，, wrong investment in 'big 
project', ‘gearing problems' and 'creative accounting,. Out of the above problems, 
Argenti criticized management's tools of using creative accounting to mislead the public. 
As cited from Argenti's comment : “almost all companies that are not healthy do 
attempt to conceal the truth in their published accounts and all ratios calculated from 
these are unreliable” In addition, Argenti also outlined a list of creative accounting 
techniques, including: 
• delay in publishing financial results to buy time. 
• overstate operating results by grouping extraordinary profit as ordinary income. 
• capitalize research costs and other costs to reduce expenditure. 
• value fixed assets at whatever figure that suits the company. 
P r o b l e m o f " O n e m a n r u l e " 
Hartley, Robert F. (1987)5 shared the view of Argenti, John (1976) on the impact 
of one-man rule on corporate performance. Hartley, Robert F. cited the success of Ray 
5 Hartley, Robert F., "Bullseyes and Blunders-Stories ofBusiness Success & Failure’’’ John Wiley & Sons， 
Inc., 1987. 
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Kroc ofMcDonald in converting a small hamburger stand into the world's largest fast-
food franchised operation, as well as the failure ofEugene Ferkauf to sustain the succes 
ofKorvette . 
S t a t u t o r y r e g u l a t i o n 
Apart from the above studies on causes and symptoms of failure, Aris, Stephen 
(1985)6 criticized the law of limited liability as “an umbrella under which the 
unscrupulous can all too easily shelter". He comment that this law, as a means of 
encouraging enterprise and protecting the imprudent from the full consequences of their 
actions, has also opened to widespread abuse. Aris stated tha t : “without the protection of 
limited liability, the change-the-name-the-game's-the-same artists would not have 
flourished". 
2 . 3 S t u d i e s o n r e m e d i a l m e a s u r e a n d t u r n a r o u n d s t r a t e g y 
Hamer, John G. (1983)7 published a study on characteristics of US companies 
undertaken troubled debt restructuring ("TDR") during 10 years period from 1972 to 
1981. Hamer considered TDR as a viable alternative for debt-laden companies to avoid 
6 Aris, Stephen, "Going Bust: Inside the bankruptcy business", Andre Deutsch Limited, 1985. 
7 Hamer, John G., "Troubled Debt Restructuring - An Alternative to Bankruptcy?", UMI Research Press, 
1983. 
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bankruptcy. TDR may consist of extension of maturity date, reduction of principal, 
reduction of interest rate, reduction of accrued interest, issue of equity as well as transfer 
of receivables. Results o fHamer ' s study are as follows: 
• 78.33% of the TDR firms were experiencing negative earnings before interest and 
tax, some of them year after year. 
• Prior to TDR, 77.33% of the firms had deficit in retained earnings, which may 
indicate net losses year after year. In addition, 36.67 % of the TDR firms had deficit 
capital balances and most of the TDR firms had negative and decreasing working 
capital. 
• After TDR, most of the firms had positive and increasing working capital. 
• There is evidence for TDR firms which never showed negative earnings and did not 




M E T H O D O L O G Y 
Data analyses and case studies will be performed to evaluate the performance of 
the loss companies selected under criteria stated in Scope of Study under Section 1.4 of 
Chapter I. 
3 . 1 D a t a A n a l y s e s 
P o p u l a t i o n a n d p e r i o d o f s t u d y 
All the companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong at 31 December 
1997 and fall into the categories of "Industries & Commerce Sector" and "Property 
Sector" will be selected to review the net profit and loss position for the latest three years. 
Respective companies with accumulated net losses for latest three years will be classified 
as "loss company" under definition of this study shown in Section 1.5 above and be 
selected for data analysis purpose. 
The period of study for data analyses will cover the latest three years, which is in 
line with the track record required for listing on the Stock Exchange o f H o n g Kong. 
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S o u r c e s o f d a t a 
Sources of financial information include published annual reports and interim 
announcement, Securities Journal, Newspaper clippings and commentaries. 
A n a l y s e s 
Data analyses will be performed for the loss companies to evaluate the 
fundamental features, operating performance, working capital management and treasury 
management of these loss companies over the latest three financial years. Further 
analyses will be extended to 20 samples out of the remaining non-failure companies for 
comparison purposes. 
3 . 2 C a s e S t u d i e s 
S e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a 
Several loss companies with sizable loss amount or distinct features will be 
selected from the list of loss companies generated from data analyses above for case 
studies. Scope of case study will cover the evaluation of the company's background, 
problems leading to failures and remedial measure undertaken by management to rescue 
the company. 
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S o u r c e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n 
Apart from the sources of information mentioned above for data analyses, 
interviews will be conducted with relevant parties such as bankers and financial persons 
to have greater in-depth knowledge of the companies concerned. 
3 . 3 L i m i t a t i o n s 
Data analyses and case studies are based on the companies' annual reports, which 
have different accounting year ends and may have adopted different accounting polices in 
the preparation of their financial statements. These inherent differences limit the 
consistent comparison of the companies' performance. 
In addition, the study is based on historical data of ex post nature with time lag 




R E S U L T S F R O M D A T A A N A L Y S E S 
A total population of 476 companies was listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong as at December 31, 1997 under Property Sector and Industries & Commerce 
Sector. Latest 3 years' profit and loss results for all the 476 companies have been 
reviewed. The finding shows that a total of 85 companies or 17.8 percentage o f t h e total 
population have recorded accumulated net losses for the latest 3 years. These 85 
companies will be referred to as the "loss companies" in the subsequent sections and in 
accordance with definition stated in Section 1.5 of Chapter I. 
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Details o f t h e data analyses results will be presented in the following sections and 
summary of findings will be discussed in Chapter VI along with findings from case 
studies to be presented in next Chapter V. 
4 . 1 P e r f o r m a n c e t r e n d o f t h e 8 5 l o s s c o m p a n i e s 
Performance trend of the 85 loss companies will be analyzed along with the size 
o f l o s s , rate of return in terms of return on equity and operating profit margin, as well as 
respective net asset value. 
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4 . 4 . 1 A n a l y s i s o n s i z e o f l o s s 
The 85 loss companies record an average accumulated net losses o fHK$176M for 
the latest 3 years, with standard deviation of HK$226M. Apart from the significant size 
o f n e t losses, operating performance of these loss companies also deteriorates over years, 
with the mean net losses increases from loss at HK$18M in 1995 to loss at HK$80M in 
1997. The Company with the greatest size of loss is Hanny Holdings Limited, a 
magnetic tape producer with aggregate net losses of HK$l,303M for the latest 3 years. 
Meanwhile, apart from the significant amount of losses in monetary terms, 
companies with losses for consecutive 2 or 3 years are not uncommon. Out of the total 
85 loss companies, there are 28 companies (33%) and 38 companies (45%) with net 
losses incurred for consecutive 3 years and 2 years respectively, ln other words, 78% of 
the loss companies are poorly performed with no sign ofimprovements over past years. 
The range of net losses incurred by the 85 loss companies are summarized in 
Table 1 in next page, showing a majority of companies with 3 years' accumulated net 
losses within HK$lOOM. 
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T a b l e 1 - L o s s c o m p a n i e s b v R a n g e o f N e t L o s s e s 
3 Y e a r s ' 
A c c u m u l a t e d N e t L o s s in l a t e s t 
N e t L o s s e s f i n a n c i a l v e a r 
H K $ ' N o . o f N o . o f 
M i l l i o n C o m p a n y % C o m p a n y % 
Loss Over 1000 1 1% 
9 0 0 - 9 9 9 1 1 % 
8 0 0 - 8 9 9 “ 1 1 % 
7 0 0 - 7 9 9 “ 3 ~ 4 %  
6 0 0 - 6 9 9 — 1 1 % 
5 0 0 - 5 9 9 — 1 1 % 1 1 % 
4 0 0 - 4 9 9 6 ~ 7 %  
3 0 0 - 3 9 9 “ 4 5 % 1 1 % 
2 0 0 - 2 9 9 8 一 9 % 4 5 % 
T0QTTW~ 17 一 20% — 14 16% 
0-99 44 '^52% 43 51% 
P i ^ O - 9 9 “ 19 22% 
2 0 0 - 2 9 9 1 1 % 
一 |Total 85 llOO%l 85 1 0 0 ° / ~ 
4 . 1 . 2 A n a l y s e s o n R e t u r n o n E q u i t y & O p e r a t i n g P r o f i t M a r g i n 
；) 
T a b l e 2 - R e t u r n o n E q u i t v ( " R O E " ) & O p e r a t i n g P r o f i t M a r g i n 
97 96 95 — 
Operating Operating Operating 
謹 Profit 職 Profit Profit 
ROE margin ^ ^ ^ margin ^ " ^ margin 
Mean -59% -18% -30% -18% -14% -13% 
3andard 172% 44% 43% 43% 58% 43% 
Deviation : 
Maximum -1439^ -338% -233% -269% [ >-442% [ -259%~ 
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Results shown in Table 2 above reflect a decreasing trend for both return on 
equity and operating profit margin over the 3 years, with greater standard deviation noted 
in 1997. 
4 . 1 . 3 A n a l y s i s b y N e t A s s e t V a l u e 
T a b l e 3 - L o s s c o m p a n i e s b v N e t A s s e t V a l u e 
H K $ M 97 96 95 
Mean Net Asset Value 270 295 365 
Range of Net Asset Value ~ ~ ^ ~ " “ 9 6 ” ~ 9 5 ~ 
H K $ , M No. of companies 
Over 1,000 5 “ ^ 8 
1 0 0 - 9 9 9 5 1 5 7 5 9 
Below 100 and > 0 22 16 17 
Below 0 7 6 1 
^ ^ ~ ~ 8 5 
% I 97 96 95 一 
P e r c e n t a g e o f l o s s c o m p a n i e s 
below HK$lOOM 3 4 % 2 6 % 2 1 % 
As shown in Table 3 above, mean net asset value of the 85 loss companies 
decreases from HK$365M in 1995 to HK$270M in 1997. The decline in net asset value is 
in line with the increase in losses incurred over the past years. 
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The poor operating results and weak asset base of the loss companies trigger the 
concerns on whether the listing status of these companies would be jeopardized. Existing 
listing requirements for floatation on Stock Exchange of Hong Kong require a minimum 
profit o fHK$20M for latest year, together with an aggregate of HK$30M profit for two 
preceding years (‘the profits test'), plus a minimum market capitalization of HK$lOOM 
(“asset test'). In these regards, all the 85 loss companies fail the profit test in view of 
accumulated net losses over past 3 years. Regarding the asset test where net asset value is 
a reference point for market capitalization, 34% of the loss companies have net asset 
value below HK$lOOM in 1997. Seven companies or 8% even have net deficits in 
shareholders' funds. The company with the worst asset base is Daido Concrete (HK) Ltd, 
a construction company which is in financial troubles and under prolonged suspension, 
with HK$444M net deficit in shareholders' fund in 1997. 
The poor financial results and asset status of the loss companies reveal the need 
for stringent statutory governance on both IPOs and post listing performance of 
companies, as well as the need for a secondary board to differentiate the quality ofl ist ing 
companies. 
Further to the performance trend of the 85 loss companies as summarized above, 
characteristics of these companies will be analyzed in the following sections according to 
their fundamental features, operational management and treasury management. 
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4 . 2 A n a l y s e s o n F u n d a m e n t a l F e a t u r e s 
4 . 2 . 1 L o s s c o m p a n i e s b y I n d u s t r y 
T a b l e 4 - L o s s c o m p a n i e s b v I n d u s t r y 
1 9 9 7 — 
M e a n M e a n M e a n 
i ^ ^ , . ^ 4 . ^ , N o . o f N e t A s s e t „ ^ , R e t u r n o n Industry 广 � , , N e t i o s s „ .. 
^ C o m p a n i e s V a l u e E q u i t y 
HK$，M H K $ , M % 
Wanufaoturing 22 26% ~~199 - 114 -104% 
Wectron/cs 19 — 22% ~~223 - 57" -18% 
^operty 11 13% 499 - 72 -32% 
Construction — 9 ~ r \ ^ ~ ~ T 2 ~ ~ - — ~ t 2 l " ^ 3 % " " 
^ta i l 8 9% ^ - 10^ -103% 
Consolidated ~ ^ ^ ^ “ - ^ -20% 
Enterprises  
Textile&Garment 4 5% 505 ~ 24 -73% 
Transportation 3 4% ~ 209 - 49 -20°/7~ 
Hotel&Catering 2 ~ 2% ~^93 - 98" -33% 
Media & 2 Wo ^88^ - 74^-78% 
Entertainment  
Total 85_ 100% “ 2 7 0 ~ - s T - 5 5 % 
Distributions of the loss companies are concentrated on manufacturing and 
electronics industries. Despite the fact that these two industries account for majority of 
listed companies in the Property Sector and Industries & Commerce Sector, the 
significant high level of negative ROE, sizable losses and weak asset base in 
manufacturing sector are signals for industry risk within this industry. 
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4 . 2 . 2 L o s s c o m p a n i e s b y L i s t i n g y e a r 
T a b l e 5 - L o s s c o m p a n i e s b v L i s t i n g v e a r 
Listing N o . o f L o s s „ , Listing N o . o f L o s s % 
year C o m p a n i e s “ year C o m p a n i e s  
1 9 6 4 1 1% 1987 2 2 % 
1 9 7 0 1 1% 1988 8 — 9% 
1971 1 — ~ r ^ 1 9 8 9 7 — 8% 
1972 4 5% V990 8 9% —  
W ^ 2 2% T991 11 13%^ 
1984 1 WT992 17 20% —  
T 9 8 ^ 1 1% ^ 3 15 ~~ 18% 
^ 8 6 1 1% T ^ 4 4 一 5% 
1995 1 1 % ~ 
ToIai 85 100% 
As shown in Table 5 above, 51% of loss companies are newly listed during the 
year 1991 to 1993, which was also the period of popular IPOs under equity market boom. 
The above result is also in line with Altman's comment on aging of company failure as 
mentioned in Section 2.1 under Literature Review on Chapter 2. 
23 
4 . 3 A n a l y s e s o n O p e r a t i o n a l M a n a g e m e n t 
This Section will focus on the operational management side in terms of turnover 
trend as well as working capital management of the loss companies. 
4 . 3 . 1 T u r n o v e r t r e n d o v e r 3 y e a r s 
T a b l e 6 - T u r n o v e r t r e n d o v e r 3 v e a r s 
H K $ , M 9 7 9 6 9 5 
Total for 85 loss companies 4 8 , 8 0 3 53 ,049 55 ,887 
Annual decrease -8% -5% 
Mean (HK$'M) 574 ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ " 6 5 7 — 
"standard Deviation 7 4 0 747 8 2 5 
Maximum 4 ,068 3 .640 4 , 3 ^ ^ 
Out o f t h e total o f 8 5 loss companies, 2 companies are dormant with no turnover 
noted for 1997 and 1996. Aggregate value of turnover for the remaining companies 
declines from 1995 to 1997 at increasing rate, with 5% decline in 1996 and 8% decline in 
1997. Meanwhile, 44 companies (52%) out of the 85 loss companies have recorded 
slashes in turnover in 1997. 
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4 . 3 . 2 T u r n o v e r b y M a j o r A c t i v i t i e s 
T a b l e 7 - T u r n o v e r b v M a i o r A c t i v i t i e s 
P e r c e n t a g e ( % ) 9 7 9 6 9 5 
Consumerproducts ~24% 34% 9% 
Electronics “ 15% — 15% — f 3 _ 
Construction 12% 1 0 % ~ ~ 6% — 
^ p u t e r _ 11% — 8% i m ^ 
Machine & T0% 7% ^ ~ ~ 
equipment  
Others 28% 26% 53% 
100% 100% 100% 
Major sales mix of the 85 loss companies is shown in Table 7 with majority of 
turnover generating from consumer products including household appliances and 
accessories etc. 
4 . 3 . 3 T u r n o v e r b y G e o g r a p h i c a l M a r k e t S e g m e n t 
T a b l e 8 - T u r n o v e r b v G e o g r a p h i c a l M a r k e t S e g m e n t 
P e r c e n t a g e ( % ) 9 7 9 6 9 5 
HongKong 37% 33% 35% 
U S A & C a n a d a 20% 2 1 % 2 3 % 
PRC 19% 15% 14% 
Europe 12% 13% 14% 
Other South East Asian 10% 16% 13% 
countries 
Others 2% 2% 1% 
1 0 0 % ~ " " 1 0 0 % " " ^ 1 0 0 % 
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Out o f t h e total o f 8 5 loss companies, no geographical analysis is disclosed in the 
annual report of 10 companies while 2 companies are dormant without turnover. 
Geographical distributions of the remaining 73 loss companies are shown in Table 8 
above and reveal that Hong Kong is still the major market segment, while on the other 
hand, an increasing trend is noted for sales to the PRC market. 
4 . 3 . 4 A n a l y s i s o n W o r k i n g C a p i t a l M a n a g e m e n t 
T a b l e 9 - C u r r e n t r a t i o 
C u r r e n t r a t i o ~ " " 9 7 ~ ~ 9 6 ” ~ " 9 5 “ 
M ^ 1 ^ ^ 1.64 
Standard deviation 1.44 1.83 1.69 
Maximum 9.98 14.64 12.42 
Minimum 0.02 0 .03 0.01 
A mean current ratio o f l . 5 3 times is recorded for the 85 loss companies in 1997， 
with standard deviation of 1.44 times. Nevertheless, there are 37 companies (43%) with 
current ratio below the safety margin of 1:1 for liquidity measurement. The average 
quick ratio improves from 0.98 in 1996 to 1.08 in 1997, whereas inventory turnover 
period declines from 26 days in 1996 to 29 days in 1997. However, comparison on 
inventory level may be distorted as reduction in inventory level may not be associated 
with improved stock management. To the contrary, the decrease is partly the result of 
clearance sales to clear stock as well as reduction in stock value due to provision made 
for obsolete stocks. 
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4 . 4 A n a l y s e s o n T r e a s u r y M a n a g e m e n t 
While operational management determines a company's profitability, treasury 
management in relation to capital structure and cash flow monitoring are also detrimental 
to a company's survival. This Section will turn to the treasury management side of the 
loss companies. 
4 . 4 . 1 A n a l y s i s o n C a p i t a l S t r u c t u r e 
T a b l e 1 0 一 D e b t t o E a u i t v R a t i o 
97 96 95 
T o t a l — T o t a l 
D e b t / L o n g - T e r m T o t a l D e b t / L o n g - T e r m D e b t / L o n g - T e r m 
E q u i t y D e b t / E q u i t y E q u i t y D e b t / E q u i t y E q u i t y D e b t / E q u i t y 
Meain~~ 147% ~~"34% " T l 1 % 4 7 % ~ ~ 95% — 48% 
^andard 3QQ0/- 52% 132% 75% 107% 77% 
Deviation  
Maximum— 2 3 9 9 % ~ ~ ~ 3 2 3 % — 895% 525% 4 9 9 % ~ ~ 3 ^ o 
Total Debt shown in Table 10 above refers to borrowings including bank loans, 
leasing and convertible bonds etc. Trade creditors and other operational liabilities are not 
included. Results in the above Table reveal that the mean gearing ratio of the 85 loss 
companies is extremely high with increasing gearing from 95% in 1995 to 147% in 1997. 
In addition, long-term debt/equity ratio is low relative to total debt/equity ratio, with a 
decreasing trend from 48% in 1995 to 34% in 1997. These figures indicate that the loss 
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companies generally rely on short term borrowings, which is considered risky as 
substantial portion o f the borrowings are due to be repaid in one year. Further analyses on 
debt maturity are shown in the following section. 
4 . 4 . 2 A n a l y s e s o n D e b t P o r t f o l i o M a n a g e m e n t - B y M a t u r i t y 
T a b l e 1 1 - D e b t b v M a t u r i t y 
一 97 96 95 
S h o r t t e r m w i t h i n 1 y e a r 7 1 % 7 1 % 7 1 % 
Long Term over 1 year 29% 29% 2 9 % 
100% 100% 100% 
Table 11 above reveals that short-term borrowings due within one year 
consistently account for 71% of total debts from 1995 to 1997. Whether heavy reliance 
on short-term debt is a healthy measure or not depends on matching against cash flow 
generated from turnover. In this regard, Debt to Turnover ratio is calculated in Table 12 
below to assess the loss companies' ability to service debts repayable in one year. 
T a b l e 1 2 - D e b t t o T u r n o v e r R a t i o 
97 96 95 一 
~ ~ S h o r t - : ~ " I 
T o t a l T e r m T o t a l S h o r t - T e r m T o t a l S h o r t - T e r m 
D e b t / D e b t / D e b t / D e b t / D e b t / D e b t / 
T u r n o v e r T u r n o v e r T u r n o v e r T u r n o v e r T u r n o v e r T u r n o v e r 
Mean 66^7 46% 119% 71% 64% 41% 
Standard 
Deviation _ 1 2 4 % 100% 374% — 3 1 % 100% 7 7 % 
Maximum| 9 3 0 % 867% 3 0 0 8 % 2 8 9 2 % 6 4 0 % 6 0 8 % 
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Results from Table 12 above demonstrate that the loss companies are susceptible 
to liquidity problems in view o f t h e high percentage of debt to turnover ratio. With short 
term debts repayable within one year account for 46% of turnover and total debts account 
for 66% of turnover, operating cash flow could hardly support the debt burden and the 
companies' ability to remain solvent is highly subject to availability of future finance. 
4 . 4 . 3 A n a l y s e s o n D e b t P o r t f o l i o M a n a g e m e n t - S o u r c e o f F i n a n c e 
> 
T a b l e 1 3 - D e b t b v S o u r c e o f F i n a n c e 
~ 9 7 ~ ~ S i ~ ~ 9 5 “ 
Bankloans 74% 76% 78% 
Lease 6% 4% 3% 
Others 20% 20% 19% 
100% 100% 1 0 0 ~ 
Bank loans include short term revolving loans, overdrafts, bills payables and long 
term syndicated loans etc. "Others" shown in Table 13 above cover convertible loans 
issued by the companies as well as loans from other sources. As shown in the above 
Table, bank borrowings consistently serve as the major source of debt financing for the 
loss companies under review. 
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T a b l e 1 4 - P r i n c i p a l B a n k e r s 
o/o o f e x p o s u r e t o 8 5 
l o s s c o m p a n i e s 
1 H o n g K o n g B a n k 5 9 % 
2 Bank o fChina 2 2 % 
3 Standard Chartered Bank 2 0 % 
4 Sin Hua Bank 15% 
5 Hang Seng Bank 13% 
6 Sanwa Bank 12% 
7 Bank o fEas t Asia 9% 
8 Dao Heng Bank ^  
In addition to above distributions, 40% of principal bankers for the loss 
companies are local bankers and remaining are mainly PRC (23%), Japanese (13%) and 
European banks (10%). 
4 . 4 . 4 A n a l y s i s o n D e b t P o r t f o l i o M a n a g e m e n t - D e b t b y S e c u r i t y 
T a b l e 1 5 - D e b t b v S e c u r i t y 
97 96 95 
Secured 65% 55% 53% 
Unsecured 2 4 % 3 2 % 3 4 % 
Others 11% 13% 13% 
100% 100% 100% 
In relation to distribution among secured and unsecured debts, there is an 
increasing trend for secured loans and major securities are properties and bank deposits. 
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On the other hand, unsecured loans are usually backed up by corporate guarantees issued 
by the listing companies to secure banking facilities granted to the subsidiaries. 
4 . 4 . 5 A n a l y s i s o n C a s h F l o w M a n a g e m e n t 
Table 16 - Cash inflow and outflow 
97 96 95 
Standard Standard Standard 
H K $ , M M e a n D e v i a t i o n M e a n D e v i a t i o n M e a n D e v i a t i o n 
Operating activities ~ 6 TTs H T7i To 89~"" 
Investing activities ^ H s ^ 9 ^ -79 ~ M O ~ " 
Financing activities ST ^29 4 0 ^33 7 6 T S 2 ~ " 
Net cash ~ ~ " ^ 13 ~ ~ 8 5 5 5 8 5 -18 ~ ~ 9 ^ ^ 
inflow/(outflow)  
Cash flow from operating activities is beyond satisfaction and keeps on 
decreasing over years. To the contrary, capital is tied up in investing activities including 
purchases of fixed assets and properties etc. ln general, overall cash flow positions of the 
loss companies are not healthy as operating cash flow could not support investing 




With reference to data analyses results in Chapter IV，6 loss companies with 
distinct features are selected for case studies in this chapter. 
5 . 1 W o K e e H o n g ( H o l d i n g s ) L t d ( " W K H " ) 
3 Years ' accumula ted net losses H K $ l M 
Net Loss in latest f inancial year 12/96 H K $ 2 3 6 M 
Net asset value at 12/96 HK$9&2M 
B a c k g r o u n d 
The Company was listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong K o n g in June 
1991 and is principally engaged in the distr ibut ion of audio visual and air 
condi t ion ing products , which account for approximately 83% of its tu rnover in 
1996. Around 58% of turnover are derived f rom Hong Kong whi le the 
remain ing are mainly f rom PRC, Singapore and Malaysia . The Company is the 
sole d is t r ibutor of branded consumer products such as ‘Pioneer，and ' M a r a n t z ' 
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fo r audiovisual products, 'Bodysonic ' and ‘ M i s s i o n， f o r speakers and 
'Mi tsubish i Heavy Indust ry ' for Air condit ioners. 
F i n a n c i a l p e r f o r m a n c e - W K H 
The Company had been performing well during the year 1992 to 1994 
with around HK$200M net profit and around 20% return on equity for each 
year. Never theless , business turned to loss in 1995 with net loss of H K $ 1 8 M in 
that year and fur ther deteriorated to a s ignif icant loss o f H K $ 2 3 7 M in 1996. 
P r o b l e m s - W K H 
Signif icant loss of HK$237M in 1996 was mainly opera t ing loss in 
nature. Despi te the Company ' s edge in possessing sole dis t r ibut ion right for its 
ma jo r products , the Company failed to sustain sa t is factory re turns and its 
pe r fo rmance was mainly af fec ted by the fol lowing factors : 
Parallel sh ipment - privacy problem is a serious issue in audiovisual segment 
as parallel shipment was sold at 30% lower than the retail pr ice charged by the 
Company . The result was the sharp fall in turnover for audiovisual divis ion, 
decreas ing f rom H K $ l , 8 0 0 M in 1994 to HK$970M in 1996, which accounted 
fo r 50% decl ine in two years ' t ime. This was detr imental to the Company as 
over 50% of total turnover were generated f rom this division. 
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C h a n g e i n c o n s u m e r p r e f e r e n c e - The ability to sustain c o n s u m e r ' s brand 
loyalty is the key to survival for the Company who relies on sole dis tr ibut ion 
right of branded products. For instance, the Company had been successful in 
p romot ing brand loyalty and retaining customers for its wel l -known brand 
'P ioneer" , under vigorous campaign of price discount for exchanging old 
models . However , recent economic downturn results in more price sensi t ive 
buyers who sacrif ice brand loyalty for lower end products . 
K e e n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h l o w m a r k e t s h a r e a n d t h i n p r o f i t m a r g i n - T h e 
Company faced keen competi t ion f rom similar brands, such as Sony and Sanyo, 
as well as pricing pressure f rom lower priced products , such as JVC As a 
result , the Company could only capture a low market share with thin and 
t r immed prof i t margin. 
R a p i d t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e s a n d o v e r s t o c k — the emergence of innovat ive 
products , such as digital versati le disc players, has shortened the product life 
cycle of the C o m p a n y ' s products, and resulted in substantial inventory being 
tied up and became obsolete stocks. Stock level had reached its cl imax of 
H K $ l , 0 6 0 M in 1995 with 4.5 months slow stock turnover period. Despi te that 
the level of tied up was alleviated in 1996 under m a n a g e m e n t ' s e f fo r t in cut t ing 
stock level by c learance sale, closing stock balance at 1996 was still high at 
H K $ 5 5 6 M . 
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N o n p r o f i t a b l e n o n - c o r e b u s i n e s s - The Company started the d is t r ibut ion of 
E u r o p e a n car and car accessor ies in 1995, such as Ferrar i and Masera t i . 
H o w e v e r , this non-core bus iness which accounted for around 9% of tu rnover in 
1996 su f f e red f r o m loss and added f inancial burden to the Company . 
R e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s u n d e r t a k e n b y m a n a g e m e n t - W K H 
I n v e n t o r y c o n t r o l - Stock purchase was suspended since 1997 and v igo rous 
c l ea rance sales were carried out to reduce stock level. 
C o s t c o n t r o l - Measures were taken to reduce overhead expend i tu re s inc lud ing 
s taf f l ayof f and re locat ion of adminis t ra t ion o f f i ce f r o m pr ime loca t ion in 
Cent ra l to Kwai Chung. 
F i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l — Right issue was done in April 1997 to raise H K $ 1 1 1 . 3 M 
fo r f i nanc ing work ing capital requi rements . 
C o m m e n t s o n r e v i v a l o f W o K e e H o n g 
D i s p o s a l o f n o n - c o r e a n d n o n - p r o f i t a b l e o p e r a t i o n - T h e C o m p a n y s h o u l d 
d i spose of f the non-core and non-prof i t ab le car divis ion and f o c u s on the prof i t 
m a k i n g air condi t ion ing sect ion, as it is not economic v iable to f i n a n c e the loss 
opera t ions . 
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5 . 2 S w a n k I n t e r n a t i o n a l M a n u f a c t u r i n g L t d ( ' ' S w a n k " ) 
3 Y e a r s ' accumula t ed net losses : H K $ 4 5 4 M 
Net Loss in la tes t f inancia l year 12/96 : H K $ 5 6 4 M 
N e t asse t va lue at 1 2 / % : H K $ 3 9 M 
B a c k g r o u n d 
The Company was listed on the Stock Exchange of H o n g K o n g in 
N o v e m b e r 1990 and is pr incipal ly engaged in the m a n u f a c t u r e and t rad ing of 
opt ical p roduc ts . Ma jo r geographica l market segments are U S A and E u r o p e 
wi th 6 5 % and 26% turnover in 1996. 
F i n a n c i a l p e r f o r m a n c e - S w a n k 
A substant ia l net loss of H K $ 5 6 4 M was recorded in 1996 which is a 
s tark cont ras t to the net p rof i t s of H K $ 4 9 M in 1995 and H K $ 6 1 M in 1994. 
> 
The loss in 1996 was mainly a t t r ibutable to opera t ing loss of H K $ 4 9 M and net 
excep t iona l losses of H K $ 4 9 5 M . The except ional losses inc luded H K $ 3 7 7 M 
prov is ion for doub t fu l debts and H K $ 9 7 M provis ion for s tocks . A fu r the r 
H K $ 3 0 9 M loss was repor ted in its 6 mon ths ' in ter im resu l t s at 6 /97, with 
H K $ 8 8 M provis ion for bad debts and H K $ 2 0 0 M recons t ruc t ion p rov i s ion . 
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P r o b l e m s - S w a n k 
O p e r a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s 
The Company had suspended trading on Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
since March 1997 and up to date. The suspension was in relat ion to al legat ion 
against certain i rregulari t ies involved in the Company ' s lens t rading activit ies. 
Summary of f ind ings against said al legat ions was released by K P M G Peat 
Marwick , the C o m p a n y ' s invest igator , on December 3, 1997 as fo l lows: 
P r o c u r e m e n t o f l e n s u n d e r i r r e g u l a r p r o c e d u r e s 一 t h e C o m p a n y p u r c h a s e d 
optical lens f rom companies apparently connected with Hanmy (Hold ing) Ltd 
group of companies , which was connected to the two brothers of the 
C o m p a n y ' s fo rmer chairman Lam Yin-sang. In addit ion, the quali ty control , 
s tock control and documenta t ion measures were unsa t i s fac tory . 
S a l e s a n d D e b t o r a g i n g p r o b l e m s - Sales of lens to a US corpora t ion , of 
which Louis Lam, the brother of the Company ' s Manag ing Direc tor , acted as 
the agent . Prof i t margin f rom these sales was extremely high at 33%. In 
addi t ion, the US sales were on open account basis which resul ted in delays in 
payment and substantial bad debts. 
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Apar t f rom the above al legat ions, the C o m p a n y ' s latest annual report at 
‘ 12/96 was re leased on July 25, 1997 and was qual i f ied by Delo i t t e Touche 
Tohmat su , the C o m p a n y ' s auditor , for the fo l lowings issues: 
A b s e n c e o f H K $ 1 4 4 M p r o v i s i o n f o r d i m i n u t i o n i n v a l u e o f p r o p e r t i e s i n 
S h e n z h e n a n d D o n g g u a n i n t h e P R C - the said assets were stated in ba lance 
sheet at 12/96 at H K $ 2 3 6 M net book value, of which only H K $ 9 2 M open 
marke t va lue was valued by independent valuer, resul t ing in unde rp rov i s ion of 
H K $ 1 4 4 M diminut ion in value. 
A b s e n c e o f H K $ 7 0 M p r o v i s i o n f o r d i m i n u t i o n i n v a l u e i n a 4 9 % h e l d 
assoc ia ted c o m p a n y which held a deve lopment site in D o n g g u a n PRC. 
A b s e n c e o f H K $ 4 0 M p r o v i s i o n f o r b a d d e b t s f o r l o a n s d u e f r o m H a n m y 
( H o l d i n g s ) L i m i t e d a n d i t s r e l a t e d c o m p a n i e s - Total amoun t s due f r o m 
H a n m y g roup at 12/96 amounted to H K $ 9 1 M , which was secured by shares in a 
c o m p a n y which only wor th H K $ 2 9 M open market value at year end date. 
D e s p i t e a bad debt provis ion o f H K $ 2 5 M being made in the ba lance sheet , the re 
w a s still unde rp rov i s ion of bad debt for H K $ 4 0 M . 
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F i n a n c i a l p r o b l e m s - S w a n k 
The Company faced severe f inancial p rob lems which w a s part ial ly 
t r iggered by huge bad debt issues. Total indebtedness to banks and other 
l enders were in excess of HK$1 billion in 1997 with H K $ 7 1 M interest burden 
fo r 12/96 and H K $ 6 3 M for 12/95. Over 40 bankers were involved which is 
cons ide red as s igni f icant ly large number of bankers for a second to four th t ier 
l is ted company . 
R e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s u n d e r t a k e n b y m a n a g e m e n t - S w a n k 
S t a n d s t i l l a g r e e m e n t - The Company had reached a standstill agreement with its 
bankers and creditors in July 1997. 
S t r e a m l i n e o p e r a t i o n s -The troubled optical trading activities was ceased in March 1997 
while other operations were either shut down or scaled down to reduce the financial 
burden. Examples were the shut down of its distribution company in France, Singapore 
and Taiwan, as well as scaled down of manufacturing operations in PRC. 
C o m m e n t s o n S w a n k 
The large number of bankers involved may make the standstill agreement 
unsuccessful due to administration time involved and difficulties to reach consensus. 
Nevertheless, restructuring seems to be the inevitable measure to avoid liquidation, while 
39 
on the other hand, the success of restructuring is highly depended on the ability to find 
new investors to inject ftind to keep the company afloat. 
5 . 3 K o s o n i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l H o l d i n g s L t d (‘‘Kosonic，，） 
3 years' accumulated net los$es : HK$293M 
Net Loss in latest financial year 9/96 HK$285M 
Negative net asset value at 9/96 Deficit of HK$96M 
B a c k g r o u n d 
‘ The Company was listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in March 1993 
and is principally engaged in the manufacture and distribution of consumer electronic 
products, which mainly comprise music centers and portable radio cassette players, both 
with and without compact disc players. Major geographical market segments are United 
Kingdom and other European countries, which accounted for 26% and 39% of turnover 
in 1996. 
F i n a n c i a l p e r f o r m a n c e - K o s o n i c 
The Company experienced downturn in turnover and operating profits in 1996, 
with 20% decline in turnover from HK$l ,172M in 1995 to HK$936M in 1996. Operating 
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results turned to loss of HK$160M, coupled with exceptional write off of stocks and 
debtors in aggregate o f H K $ l 16M. 
P r o b l e m s - K o s o n i c 
The cash-strapped Company has been under prolonged suspension in trading in 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong since October 1996, due to severe liquidity problems 
which resulted in temporary cessation of production. The Company was highly geared 
with net current liabilities of HK$326M and shareholder's deficit of HK$96M at 9/96. 
Current liabilities amounted to HK$581M with HK$316M being bank loans to be repaid 
within a year, while current assets mainly composed of HK$202M stock on hand which 
are hardly realizable into cash. The severe liquidity problem not only resulted in high 
interest burden o f H K $ 3 5 M for 1996, it also led to suspension of production plants due to 
lack of working capital. 
P r o b l e m s - K o s o n i c 
Factors contributing to the Company's operational and financial problems are 
outlined below: 
• O v e r e x p a n s i o n - rapid post listing expansion and establishment of new production 
plants in diversified locations in PRC had resulted in high gearing level. 
• W r o n g p r o d u c t p o s i t i o n i n g t r i g g e r e d b y d o w n t u r n o f e l e c t r o n i c i n d u s t r y -
Target market segment of the Company's products is lower end electronic products 
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under private label. Nevertheless, setback of electronic industry in Japan during the 
years concerned as followed by dumping of household brand by Japanese companies 
had threatened the competitiveness of the Company's products and eroded its market 
share. 
• S q u e e z e o f p r o f i t m a r g i n as a result ofkeen competition in the industry. 
• H i g h l e v e l o f i n v e n t o r y - over expansion coupled with adverse market condition 
resulted in high level of inventory being tied up and consequential severe cash flow 
problems. 
• P r o h i b i t i v e i n t e r e s t p a y m e n t s to service the Company's high level ofdebts . 
• H i g h o v e r h e a d resulting from diversified production plants. 
R e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s u n d e r t a k e n b y m a n a g e m e n t - K o s o n i c 
B u s i n e s s r e s t r u c t u r i n g t o s t r e a m l i n e o p e r a t i o n s 
C o n s o l i d a t e p r o d u c t i o n p l a n t s by shutting down production plants in rented premises at 
6 locations in PRC, and centralize production in the leased owned factory in Huang Tian 
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in Shenzhen. Production lines were reduced from 30 to 10 and inventory control was 
tightened. 
S a l e s d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n through refocusing on manufacturing higher margin VCD products 
and decreasing exposures to less profitable audio products. 
Overhead control of scaling down workforce by 70% from 8,000 workers to 2,300 
workers. 
D e b t r e s t r u c t u r i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s 
Up to the date of this report, standstill agreements had been reached with Bankers 
and creditors to extend their deferral of repayments, and the Company is in the progress 
of seeking new investors to support the Company. 
C o m m e n t s o n K o s o n i c 
Resumption of production is depended on outcome of negotiations with Bankers 
‘ to extend banking facilities and capital injection from new investors. Nevertheless, the 
downturn of electronics industry together with Asian turmoil exert further pressure to the 
Company. 
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5 . 4 E m p e r o r C h i n a ( C o n c e p t ) L t d (“Emperor，，、 
3 years' accumulated net losses :HK$ 244M 
Net Loss in latest financial year 3/97 :HK$ 94M 
Net asset value at 3/97 :HK$l,103M 
B a c k g r o u n d 
The Group was listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in July 1992 and is 
principally engaged in property investment and development in PRC, printing services 
and newspaper publishing, wholesaling and retailing of furniture and securities trading in 
Hong Kong. 
P e r f o r m a n c e - E m p e r o r 
The Group recorded losses for consecutive years from 1995 to 1997 with net loss 
of HK$94M in 1997. The losses were mainly aroused from newspapers and publishing 
activities under the Group's subsidiary, Hong Kong Daily News. 
P r o b l e m s - E m p e r o r 
Major problems encountered by the Group's newspaper segment were keen 
competition and dynamic changes in media industry. Competitive moves by market 
leader such as price wars triggered by Apple Daily News and Pearl Oriental News in 
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1996 further trimmed the profit margin of the Group. Meanwhile, the Group's 
,j 
investments in entertainment activities through Fitto Mobile were also at losses. On the 
other hand, sluggish property market in PRC further undermined the Group's profitability 
in 3/97 with HK$19.8M loss arising from the write off of a holiday resort in PRC. 
R e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s u n d e r t a k e n b y m a n a g e m e n t - E m p e r o r 
Negotiations had been undertaken by management to scale down non-profitable 
investments in Fitto Mobile. 
C o m m e n t s o n E m p e r o r 
With the Group's principal activities competing in industries under keen 
competition and setback , such as newspaper, media entertainment and PRC property, 
viability of the Group's business is highly depended on financial support from its holding 
company, as well as measures to streamline operation and reduce overhead costs. 
5 . 5 A s i a C o m m e r c i a l H o l d i n g s L t d ( “ A s i a Commercial，，） 
3 years' accumulated net losses : HK$871M 
Net profit at latest financial year 3/97 :HK$254M 
Net asset value at 3/97 ;HK$199M 
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B a c k g r o u n d 
‘ The Company was listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in 1989 and is 
principally engaged in the assembly and sale of complete watches, trading of watch 
components and property investment. Over 90% of turnover were related to watch 
business with major market segments in Hong Kong (65%) and PRC(20%). 
P e r f o r m a n c e 一 A s i a C o m m e r c i a l 
Following the significant losses o fHK$166M in 1995 and HK$959M in 1996, a 
turnaround to profit o f H K $ 254M was recorded for 1997, after taking into account of an 
exceptional gain o f H K $ 368M led by profit from capital restructuring, bank compromise 
and note arrangements, ln other words, the core business is still at loss of HK$ 80M 
despite the decrease in losses as compared with previous years. Meanwhile, the loss of 
HK$ 959M in 1996 was mainly driven by an exceptional loss of HK$ 651M from the 
write-off of a PRC property investment. 
P r o b l e m s - A s i a C o m m e r c i a l 
• O v e r e x p a n s i o n t o n o n c o r e a n d il l- f a t e d P R C p r o p e r t y m a r k e t - T h e C o m p a n y ' s 
expansion into non core PRC property project is the fatal move that brought the 
company to loss position and close to bankruptcy. An aggregate amount of HK$ 
434M was written off as exceptional loss in 1996 and 1997, for properties under 
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development and completed properties for sale in Dongguan Lakeview residential 
properties and golf club. 
• Loss of key customers for core business in original equipment manufacturing for 
watches led to fall in turnover. 
• L i q u i d i t y p r o b l e m s arising from property projects imposed financial constraints on 
the smooth functioning of watch component trading business. 
• E x p o s u r e t o f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e r i s k under adverse movements of Japanese Yen. 
R e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s u n d e r t a k e n b y m a n a g e m e n t - A s i a C o m m e r c i a l 
Debt restructuring 
The Group's indebtedness o f H K $ 1 billion was restructured as follows: 
• B a n k C o m p r o m i s e - The 14 bankers of the Group consent to waive outstanding 
loans in aggregate of HK$726M, in consideration for a cash payment by the 
Company o fHK$102 .5M and the allotment of a total of 83.96M new shares by the 
Company at HK$1 each. Respective bank compromise represented a 74% loans 
waiver by the 14 bankers, and resulted in a net gain of HK$532M by the Company 
as exceptional gain for the year ended 3/97. 
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• N o t e m o r a t o r i u m a n d n o t e e x c h a n g e - 10 years' extension was granted by the 
noteholders for the HK$ 304M convertible notes repayable on February 2000， 
together with a interest rate cut for 87.5 basis point per annum plus waiver of interest 
for 5 years' period retroactive from February 1996. A net gain of HK$232M arising 
from this note arrangement was taken up as exceptional gain for the year ended 3/97. 
• S h a r e issue to new investors for H K $ 1 1 2 . 5 M . 
• M a r k e t i n g f o c u s o n long term customers. 
• R e d u c e o v e r h e a d c o s t s by slashing payroll for Swiss market segment. 
• D i s p o s a l o f n o n - c o r e p r o p e r t y p r o j e c t and refocus on core business. 
C o m m e n t s o n A s i a C o m m e r c i a l 
The Company is a typical case whereby a profitable newly listed company 
became over zealous in utilizing the newly raised funds to embark into new lines of 
operation for higher returns. Nevertheless, it is also a typical case where the new 
investment turned out to be a mis-step into the overheated PRC market, especially on the 
property side. Result of this move was fatal as it also ruined the core business. Indeed, the 
core business of distribution of branded watches, with Hong Kong being the major 
market, had been deteriorating over the past few years. Decline in both turnover and 
profit margin were noted with low inventory turnover period of over two months. 
Promotional sales had been made to clear the inventory level. Sales of the Company's 
sole distributing brands, such as 'Carven', was not as promising as it looked. Under the 
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internal financial constraints, coupled with external keen competition and recent 
economic downturn in the Company's major market segment in Hong Kong, recovery 
in short run is not optimistic. 
5 . 6 Y a o h a n H o n g K o n g C o r p o r a t i o n L t d (‘‘Yaohan，，） 
Yaohan Hong Kong Corporation Limited 
3 years' accumulated net losses ; HK$ 316M 
Net losses at latest financial year 3/97 : HK$ 104M 
Net asset value at 3/97 : HK$ 3 5M 
Yaohan International Holdings Limited 
3 years' accumulated net profit ; HK$ 289M 
Net profit at latest financial year 3/97 : HK$ 61M 
Net asset value at 3/97 ； HK$l ,315M 
Background 
The demise of Yaohan Group in late 1997 marked the end of the magnificent 
dream pursued by its maverick high-profile chairman, Kazuo Wada. The Wada family 
indirectly held 5 listed companies in Hong Kong with diversified business including 
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department stores (42%) , catering and bakeries (7%), food processing and trading 
(28%), indoor family entertainment center (35%) , as well as retail and catering 
operations in Shanghai, Liannong and Wuxi in the PRC. Following the unveil of 
financial difficulties of the Japanese holding company, Yaohan Japan Corporation, both 
Yaohan International Holdings Limited and Yaohan Hong Kong Corporation Limited 
were suspended on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong since 18 September 1997 and 
announcement on voluntary wind up were finally released on 10 February 1998. 
P r o b l e m s - Y a o h a n 
Yaohan had become a top Japanese brand in Southeast Asian countries including 
Japan, Hong Kong, PRC, Singapore and Malaysia over the past decade. Factors that 
turned the giant from boom to gloom are highlight below: 
O v e r e x p a n s i o n - As stated by Mistsumasa Wada, Yaohan Japan's president and the 
brother o f K a z u o Wada, Yaohan Japan's failure was due to its excessive investments both 
in Japan and overseas. This made it impossible to redeem the 40 billion yen bonds. 
C a p i t a l t i e d u p i n p r o p e r t i e s - Lease or buy decision is a dilemma faced by the Group 
as leasing department space is susceptive to rental acceleration, such as the case for the 
Shatin store in Hong Kong. On the other hand, having self-owned department space is a 
serious concern on liquidity, interest burden and timing on making the purchase. Huge 
capital was tied up in the purchase of department sites in Lam Tin, Yuen Long and 
Shanghai, as well as Wada 's quarter in Sky High and office in Conventional Center. 
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S l u g g i s h P R C m a r k e t - Expansion into PRC market was hit by the austerity measures in 
the PRC during the past years. 
A c c e l e r a t i n g r e n t a l e x p e n s e s - Profit margin of department stores in Hong Kong was 
trimmed by accelerating rental expense in the wake of property market boom in past 
years. Rental expenses for department stores and staff quarters in 3/97 amounted to 
HK$460M, being 11% of total turnover of HK$4,068M. Under accelerating rental 
expenses, the Group was forced to scale down 50% space in Shatin store in September 
1994, which was the first Yaohan store in Hong Kong opened since December 1984. 
C a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e Expansions and capital investments in Hong Kong were supported by 
principal banker the HongKong Bank. Nevertheless, Yaohan failed to maintain 
established relationship with bankers in Japan homeland. Indeed, three of the major 
bankers, namely Tokai Bank, Long-term Credit Bank of Japan and Sumitomo Trust 
dropped Yaohan in 1992 in view of the Group's aggressive moves. This turned the 
Group to bond market for financing overseas investments under higher interest premium. 
M a r k e t i n g s t r a t e g y 一 There have been critics on Yaohan's market positioning strategy 
as being too deeply mired in selling local products and franchises, with the lack of 
international flavor as compared to her competitor, such as Sogo. 
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R e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s u n d e r t a k e n b y m a n a g e m e n t - Y a o h a n 
D i s p o s a l o f i n v e s t m e n t s a n d p r o p e r t i e s - A series of disposal of investments were 
carried out since May 1995 to September 1997 with aggregate proceeds of around 
HK$22.5 billion. Investments and properties disposed including head office in 
Conventional Center for HK$3.5 billion, residential properties in Sky High for HK$3.75 
billion, as well as part o f t h e shareholdings in the profitable business in catering and food 
processing sides. Nevertheless, these series of measures failed to rescue the Group. 
C o m m e n t s o n Y a o h a n 
Collapse of the Yaohan empire reflects how Wada's expansionist dream turned 
opportunities into threats. Being a high-geared company under rapid expansion into new 
market, with the lack of back up from stable growth in cash generated operations, the 
story o fYaohan going bust is a lesson for many other companies in similar positions. 
52 
CHAPTER VI 
S U M M A R Y O F F I N D I N G S 
Summary of findings from Data Analyses (Chapter IV) and Case Studies (Chapter 
V) on the loss companies will be presented in this Chapter. For comparison purpose, 
further data analyses along the same lines have been extended to a sample of 20 
companies out of the remaining 391 profit making companies in the Property Sector and 
Industries & Commerce Sector. Accordingly, features of the 85 loss companies will be 
discussed along with findings from the 20 samples of their profit making counterparts. 
6 . 1 S u m m a r y o f findings f r o m D a t a A n a i v s e s 
In general, the 85 loss companies show signs of deterioration in overall 
performance, both in terms of operational and treasury management. Loss companies 
with accumulated net losses for latest 3 years account for 17.8% of total population in the 
two sectors, including 28 loss companies with net losses for consecutive 3 financial 
years. Comparison between the 85 loss companies and 20 samples of profit making 
companies are summarized in Table 17 in next page: 
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T a b l e 1 7 - O p e r a t i o n a l P e r f o r m a n c e : 8 5 L o s s c o m p a n i e s v s 
2 0 s a m p l e s o f p r o f i t m a k i n g c o m p a n i e s 
20 samples 
85 Loss Co. Of Profit making  
c a  
Fundamental Features Mean Mean 
M a j o r A c t i v i t i e s 
-Manufacturing 2 6 % 3 0 % 
-Electronics 2 2 % 15% 
M a j o r l i s t i n g y e a r ( 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 5 ) 5 7 % 8 0 % 
Operational performance Mean Mean 
3 Years，accumulated earnings Loss HK$176M Profit HK$437M 
ROE in 1997 _59% 23% 
Operating profit margin in 1997 -18% 16% 
N e t A s s e t V a l u e in 1 9 9 7 
- M e a n Net Asset Value HK$270M HK$986M 
- % with NAV below HK$lOOM 3 4 % Nil 
T u r n o v e r - Mean in 1997 HK$ 574M HK$1,767M 
T u r n o v e r g r o w t h 
- 1 9 9 7 -8% + 1 1 % 
- 1 9 9 6 -5% + 1 4 % 
Major market segment - HK 37% 3 5 % 
Working capital management Mean Mean 
Current Ratio (1997) 1 .53 t imes 1 .56 t imes 
Quick Ratio (1997) 1 .08 t i m e s 1 .16 t i m e s 
Inventory turnover period (1997) 2 9 d a y s 6 2 d a y s 
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6 . 1 . 1 F u n d a m e n t a l F e a t u r e s 
As indicated in Table 17 above, around 48% of the 85 loss companies within the 
Property Sector and Industries & Commerce Sector are associated with manufacturing 
and electronics industries. The result is not surprising as these two industries are 
dominant industries within these two sectors, and the same distribution is noted from the 
samples of profit making companies. Regarding the aging of the loss companies, over 
57% are listed under 6 years from 1991 to 1995. This finding can be associated with 
8 • 
comment from Altman, Edward I. in 1993 as mentioned in the Literature Review 
Section in Chapter 2.1. According to Altman, Edward I., 31.4% of company failure in US 
in 1990 occurred in companies formed within 3 years. Although Altman had not 
differentiated the aging effects among public and private companies, similar findings 
from Altman's and from this study indicate that the sudden growth of a company upon 
IPO is as risky as an infant business during its formation stage. 
Another fmding is the weak asset base of the loss companies. The mean net asset 
. value of the loss companies is HK$270M in 1997 with 34% of these companies having 
NAV below HK$lOOM, as contrast to the mean net asset value of HK$986M for the 
samples of profit making companies. The weak asset base of these loss companies is a 
chicken-and-egg situation as it may be both the cause and result of poor profitability. As 
such, operational performance of these companies will be examined in the coming 
section. 
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6 . 1 . 2 O p e r a t i o n a l P e r f o r m a n c e 
As shown in Table 17 above, profitability of the 85 loss companies is 
discouraging, with an average accumulated net losses o f H K $ 1 7 6 M for the latest 3 years. 
There is also sign ofdeterioration in both Return on Equity ("ROE") and Operating Profit 
Margin. Mean o f R O E declines from negative 14% in 1995 to negative 30% in 1996, and 
is further worsened to negative 59% in 1997. This is a dangerous signal as persistent 
negative earnings threaten liquidity position. A proven case had been shown by Hamer, 
John G.9 in 1983 and mentioned in Literature Review section in Chapter 2.3, that 78.33% 
of companies in United States under troubled debt restructuring had experienced 
consecutive negative returns in latest years. 
Furthermore, it is also found that the decline in ROE for the loss companies is a 
combination of slash in turnover and shrinkage in operating profit margin. Turnover 
decreases in both 1996 and 1997, while operating profit margin slashes from negative 
13% in 1995 to negative 18% in both 1996 & 1997. Around 40% of to ta l turnover for the 
loss companies in 1997 are derived from consumer and electronics products. Regarding 
geographical market segment, sales in Hong Kong (37%) and USA & Canada (20%) 
account for over 50% of total turnover in 1997. 
8 Altman, Edward I., "Corporate Financial Distress and bankruptcy - A complete guide to predicting & 
avoiding distress and profiting from bankruptcy", a Wiley Finance Edition, 2^ Edition, 1993. 
9 Hamer, John G., "Troubled Debt Restructuring - An Alternative to Bankruptcy?", UMI Research Press, 
1983. 
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As contrast to the 85 loss companies, the operational performance of the 20 
samples of profit making companies are rather promising, with mean aggregate 3 years' 
net profits o fHK$437M, plus 23% ROE and 16% operating profit margin in 1997. Two-
digit growth in turnover is also noted for both 1996 & 1997. 
6 . 1 . 3 W o r k i n g C a p i t a l M a n a g e m e n t 
As shown in Table 17 in Page 53 above, one distinct feature of working capital 
management of the 85 loss companies is having mean current ratio exceeding one (the 
safe margin) throughout the past three years, with 1.64 in 1995, 1.47 in 1996 and 1.53 in 
1997. Quick ratio after excluding inventory is around 1: 1 for the three years with 1.13 
in 1995, 0.98 in 1996 and 1.08 in 1997. Corresponding ratio for the samples of profit 
making companies is only slightly better with 1.56 current ratio and 1.16 quick ratio in 
1997. However, attention is drawn to the fact that liquidity improvement for the loss 
companies in 1997 was partly due to debt restructuring program of certain troubled 
companies, which had reduced their indebtedness at the expenses of creditors, bankers 
and bond holders. 
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6 . 1 . 4 T r e a s u r y M a n a g e m e n t 
T a b l e 1 8 - C a p i t a l S t r u c t u r e ; 8 5 L o s s c o m p a n i e s v s 
2 0 s a m p l e s o f p r o f i t m a k i n g c o m p a n i e s 
20 samples 
85 Loss Co. Of Profit making  
c a  
BeatingiMio Mean Mean 
D e b t / E q u i t y R a t i o 
- T o t a l D e b t s / E q u i t y ( 1 9 9 7 ) 1 4 7 % 5 6 % 
- L o n g Term Debts/Equity (1997) 3 4 % 2 8 % 
Debtportfolio - Maturity Mean Mean 
D e b t b y m a t u r i t y ( 1 9 9 7 ) 
- % o f S h o r t t e r m d e b t A T o t a I d e b t s 7 1 % 5 6 % 
D e b t r T u r n o v e r r a t i o 
- S h o r t T e r m d e b t s / T u r n o v e r ( 1 9 9 7 ) 4 6 % 2 4 % 
-Tota l debts/Turnover (1997) 6 6 % 4 7 % 
Debt portfolio 一 Source of Mean Mean 
finance 
M a j o r s o u r c e - B a n k l o a n s ( 1 9 9 7 ) 7 4 % 9 ? % 
% of Secured debts/Total debts (1997) 6 5 % 4 6 % 
Cash Flow management Mean Mean 
Operating activities (1997) HK$6M HK$235M 
Investing activities (1997) -HK$23M -HK$192M 
Financing activities (1997) HK$51 M HK$228M 
Net cash flow (1997) HK$13M HK$93M 
<； 
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C a p i t a l S t r u c t u r e 
With reference to Table 18 above, there is a trend for accelerating mean gearing 
ratio (Total Debt/Equity) for the 85 loss companies, which increases from 95% in 1995 to 
111% in 1996 and further soars to 147% in 1997. This is significantly high as compared 
with corresponding gearing of 56% in 1997 for the samples of profit making 
counterparts. With the lack of profit plow back and relatively weak equity base as 
compared to the profit making companies, debt financing inevitably turns out to be the 
major source of fmance for the loss companies. 
L o a n P o r t f o l i o M a n a g e m e n t 
M i s - m a t c h o f l o a n t e n u r e a g a i n s t c a s h flow - Apart from reliance on debt financing, 
the 85 loss companies have common features in loan portfolio management. In general, 
short term financing is the major source of finance for the 85 loss companies. This can be 
judged from the maturity term where a consistent pattern is noted throughout 1995 to 
1997, with 71% of total debt being short term repayable within one year. 
Corresponding ratio for the 20 samples of profit making companies is much lower at 
56%. 
Comment on the reliance on short term financing should be made along with the 
cash flow pattern of these companies. According to the cash flow analysis for 1997, the 
mean cash inflow from operating activities for these 85 loss companies is only HK$6M , 
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which could hardly meet the mean cash outflow o fHK$23M for investing activities. As a 
result, these companies are heavily relying on financing activities to support cash flow 
requirements, with mean cash flow from financing o fHK$51M in 1997. To the contrary, 
cash flow management of the 20 samples of profit making companies is much stronger, 
. » with operating cash inflow of HK$235M in 1997 which can fully cover the HK$192M 
cash outflow for investing activities, and with net cash inflow o fHK$93M. 
Consequently, the highly geared companies are exposing themselves to further 
liquidity risk as income stream from existing turnover level is beyond satisfaction to 
service outstanding debts. In substance, the high gearing position will also jeopardize 
future debt financing. As a matter of fact and as advised by the senior executive of The 
Fuji Bank, total outstanding short term borrowings of the borrowers should not exceed 
1/3 of turnover. In this regard, it is rather difficult for the loss companies to seek external 
debt finance as the 46% mean ratio of short term debts to turnover has far exceeded the 
i> 
bank's credit limit. The same ratio for the 20 samples of profit making companies is only 
24%, which falls within the bank's threshold. 
In view of the relatively high amount of capital tied up in investing activities, 
such as fixed assets and properties etc., matching long term investments with short term 
borrowings is a mis-matching and risky policy. 
S o u r c e o f f i n a n c e - Bank loans are the major source of finance for both the loss 
companies and the samples of profitable companies. The remaining sources of loans 
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mainly come from leasing, convertible bonds and loans from other parties. According to 
the list of principal bankers disclosed in annual reports of the 85 loss companies, Hong 
Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, who is the principal banker of many listed 
companies, ranks first with greatest exposures to the loss companies. Bank of China and 
Standard Chartered Bank ranks second and third respectively. In general, 40% of 
principal bankers are local bankers and remaining are mainly PRC (23%), Japanese 
(13%) and European Banks (10%). 
Apart from findings summarized above, another trend is the increase in 
percentage of secured loans for the loss companies over the past years, with percentage of 
secured loans increases from 55% in 1996 to 65% in 1997. To the contrary, the said 
percentage decreases for the 20 samples of profit making companies, which declines 
from 54% in 1995 to 46% in 1997. This can be explained by the fact that a profitable 
company has stronger bargaining power to negotiate clean loans from bankers and other 
lenders, and vice versa for the loss companies. To conclude, increase in secured liabilities 
is not favorable as lien on assets affects operational flexibility and it also reduces the 
company's borrowing potential. 
In general, findings from the above data analyses reveal a general setback in the 
performance of the 85 loss companies, both in terms of profitability, working capital 
management and treasury management. 
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6 . 2 S u m m a r y o f findines f r o m C a s e S t u d i e s 
T h e fo l lowing table summar izes the ma jo r fac tors a t t r ibutable to the poor 
opera t ional p e r f o r m a n c e of the six loss companies discussed in C a s e Studies Sect ion in 
C h a p t e r V: 
M a j o r P r o b l e m s 
O v e r e x p a n s i o n 
Principal Core Non-core Product 
Company Activities Business Business Competition Obsolescence Irregularities 
WoKee Audio visual Parallel Rapid 
Hong products shipment technological 
.:::::::::::::::::::::.:::.:::::::::.-::::.:.::.::: changes : ； : 
Swank Optical Irregular 




Kosonic Compact Over Dumping of Rapid 
disc&radio expansion household technological 
cassette inPRC brands by changes 
production competitors 
plants ：. 
Asia Watch & Over 
Commercial watch investment 
component in PRC 
property  
Yaohan Department Over 
store & expansion 
catering in PRC 
.： : . retail . 
Emperor Newspaper Keen 
China publishing competition 
(Concept) & property in newspaper 
publishing 
> — » » — « » » » » » » » » I market ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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The above cases are only part of the many corporate failure victims in Hong Kong 
in recent years. This convey the message that failure can occur in any industry, any 
market segment and with any size of the company, ln each case the underlying causes of 
disasters have been either aggressive moves at the wrong time or failures to respond to 
market changes. Nevertheless, management quality is still the down to earth problem for 
failure. 
Unlike the sizable giants and regulated industries, survival of the second to fourth 
tier listed companies is inherently risky due to their size and keen competitive 
environments. As such, management quality is the key determinant for success. Typical 
management problems of newly listed companies are the failures to adjust management 
style to cope with expansion, as well as the lack of long term perspective on corporate 
strategies. Indeed, a large number of these companies are still running under family style 
and/or small business management style, with one man rule or family team dictating all 
decisions. This is risky as the company's fortune is highly subject to the calibre of these 
few leaders. The lack of open voices and lack of dynamic adjustments to cope with 
business growth are fatal for failure. Yaohan is a typical case of one man rule and having 
family team dominating management decisions. 
Apart from the lack of scientific management style, management philosophy is 
another point of concern. An example is Siu Fung Ceramics who sells both ceramic 
‘ products and ceramic producing machinery, which is cannibalism in nature as the sales of 
ceramic producing machinery is in substance generating competition for the ceramic 
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product lines. This case demonstrates management's confusion of long term perspective 
on corporate strategy. 
To conclude, the fate of the companies is rested in the hand of the management 
board, whether they can outperform the counterparts is blessed by their management 
quality and philosophy. Nevertheless, money is gone and only regret is shown. 
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CHAPTER VII 
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Hong Kong listed companies have been experiencing setbacks in overall 
performance in recent years, with soaring news on listed companies plunging into losses 
or failing to service their debts. The problem is not just financial, as operational losses of 
the company is usually a signal for liquidity problems, which would ultimately hit the 
shareholders, creditors, employees, and would finally spread the troubles to the whole 
economy in the form of domino effect. 
An outline of the persistent poor performance of the two sectors under second to 
fourth tier listed companies in Hong Kong, namely the Industries & Commerce Sector 
and Property Sector, has been summarized in previous sections, ln this section, focus will 
be based on recent economic climate in Hong Kong, and we will look forward to 
potential opportunities and threats faced by the Hong Kong listed companies and their 
counterparts. 
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7 . 1 R e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s - M a i o r t h r e a t s f a c e d b v H o n g K o n g l i s t e d c o m p a n i e s 
E c o n o m i c d o w n t u r n in H o n g K o n g 
The aftermath of recent Asian turmoil, bearish stock market and sluggish 
property market in Hong Kong have turned the booming economy to a gloomy outlook. 
Direct impacts on economy are news on business scaled down and unemployment, 
which further reduce real consumption power and propensity to spend. Major industries 
hit by the recent economic slow down include the property, construction and retail 
sectors. The 30% slash in property value has driven the property giant, such as Sun Hung 
Kai, to suspend development projects. The gloomy environment also hits the retail sector 
with two listed companies, Joyce Boutique and Theme International Ltd, going into 
operational and financial problems. Other listed companies are not immune from this 
threat. 
T i g h t e n s o u r c e o f f u n d s 
Apart from economic slow down, another threat faced by companies in Hong 
Kong is the tightened source of funds. The availability and cost of funding are critical 
determinants of a company's survival, especially for those highly geared companies. 
Unfortunately, Hong Kong listed companies are facing threats from the shrinkage of 
funds from two major sources, namely equity finance and debt finance. 
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E q u i t y f i n a n c e 
The bearish stock market since stock market crash in October 1997 has 
eliminated the opportunities for equity financing through initial public offers and 
placements. With the slash in opportunities for cheaper equity financing, companies have 
to turn to the more expensive debt financing to support the business. 
D e b t f i n a n c i n g 
Companies which are relying on or tend to rely on debt financing are under a 
hard time as affected by the followings factors: 
T i g h t e n i n g b a n k c r e d i t 
The bursting of Asian turmoil and consequential bad debt problems faced by 
multinational banks have pushed the banks towards a tightened credit policy. This trend 
has far-fetching impact on Hong Kong listed companies as bank financing is the major 
source of debt financing in Hong Kong as compared to the immature bond market. 
In order to assess the potential threats faced by the Hong Kong listed companies, 
interviews have been conducted with a number of senior executives of major banks in 
Hong Kong for comment on credit policy. Indebtedness are owed to the executives of 
two Japanese banks, The Fuji Bank and The Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, as well as 
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executives from local banks, The HongKong Bank and The Shanghai Commercial Bank, 
for their invaluable comments. 
C o n s o l i d a t i o n o f J a p a n e s e b a n k s 
ln general, there is signal of Japanese banks consolidating their exposures in 
Hong Kong in response to the troubled financial system in Japan. An example is the 
closure of Hong Kong branch of Takugin International Asia, a Japanese based bank 
concentrating in syndicated loans. Other Japanese banks retaining exposures in Hong 
Kong have adopted a series of measures since early 1998 to tighten credit: 
T e m p o r a r y s u s p e n s i o n o f c r e d i t l i n e - Since January 1998, several Japanese banks, 
including the major conglomerates Dai-Ichi Kanyo, Sumitomo, Fuji Bank, Sanwa Bank 
and Industrial Bank of Japan etc., have carried out rigorous review on loan portfolio 
status and have adopted a more conservative policy for loan approvals. Measures include 
temporary suspension of the revolving credit line for money market loan and trade 
facilities. These have intensified the financial troubles of listed companies and the 
‘ situation has not turnaround up to now. Indeed, the Japanese banks are not over-worry as 
they are suffering from bad debt issues arising from recent outburst of insolvency for 
many listed companies, including Mansion Holdings, Theme International, Leading Spirit 
Conronwa Electric and Interform etc. 
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I n c r e a s e i n t e r e s t s p r e a d - Apart from tightened credit, many Hong Kong listed 
companies are facing upward interest spread adjustment charged by Japanese banks. This 
exerts further interest burden on listed companies as Japanese funding used to be a 
cheaper source of funds, with lower interest spread (as low as 50 basic points spread for 
first tier listed companies) as compared with local and European banks. 
Apart from shrinkage of funding from Japanese banks, other local and European 
banks also become more skeptical in approving credit facilities to listed companies, with 
higher interest spread, harsher terms on collateral and financial undertakings etc. 
In general, financial statuses of Hong Kong listed companies are now threatened 
by capital tied up in the sluggish property and security markets, and are further hit by the 
shrinkage in sources of funds from both debt and equity financing. Consequently, these 




7 . 2 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
Economic turmoil in Asian region is burdening Hong Kong companies with 
operational and financial problems. Responsiveness to changes is the key point for 
survival and even turning crisis to opportunities. With reference to the causes of failure 
for the listed companies and current threats faced by them, listed below is an outline of 
critical concerns for the management oflisted companies: 
O p e r a t i o n a l M a n a g e m e n t 
O p p o r t u n i t i e s 
• S e i z e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a c q u i r i n g g o o d q u a l i t y i n v e s t m e n t s w h i c h a r e n o w 
u n d e r v a l u e d - attention should be drawn to synergy effects among new and existing 
investments and expected pay back period. 
• S t r i v e f o r s n a t c h i n g m a r k e t s h a r e dropped by insolvent competitors. 
However, management should be cautious in PRC investments. First of all, linking up 
with the right channel is crucial for PRC investments such as acquiring good quality 
state owned investment through channels under mutually benefits. On the other hand, 
the immature PRC retail market should be avoided unless only minimal running costs are 
required. 
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S t r e a m l i n e e x i s t i n g o p e r a t i o n s 
O p e r a t i o n a l M a n a g e m e n t 
• S c a l e d o w n o r c e a s e n o n - p r o f i t a b l e o p e r a t i o n s - an example is Hutchison's closure 
of non-profitable operations in early years. 
• E n f o r c e s t r i n g e n t c o s t c o n t r o l t o e n h a n c e c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s o f p r o d u c t - close 
negotiation with worldwide suppliers to strive for favorable terms. An example is the 
revitalization o f B M W through tightening cost control in recent years. 
• Tighten inventory control - Lack of scientific inventory control is one of the 
problems faced by local listed companies. Focus should be made to avoid inventory 
tied up and obsolescence. Examples are the applications of just - in-t ime inventory 
control and other advanced technology such as Electronic Data Integration (EDI) for 
order processing. 
• T i g h t e n d e b t c o n t r o l a n d e x t e n d s u p p l i e r c r e d i t t e r m s . 
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T r e a s u r y M a n a g e m e n t 
• R e s t r u c t u r e l o a n p o r t f o l i o s a n d m a t c h l o a n s a g a i n s t c a s h i n f l o w — avoid mis-
matching short term borrowings against long term cash generating investments. 
• S h i f t a p o r t i o n o f l o a n p o r t f o l i o f r o m s h o r t t e r m f i n a n c i n g t o l o n g t e r m f i n a n c i n g 
- s y n d i c a t e d loan is a measure for more stable financing and to enhance better 
treasury management. However, attention should be drawn to the tradeoff of higher 
interest spread for syndicated loans as compared with HIBOR revolving loans. 
• Limit the number of bankers and focus on long term relationship with 
e s t a b l i s h e d b a n k s - Having relatively small amount of indebtedness to a large 
number of bankers is not favorable in times of negotiating standstill agreement. The 
problems involved are longer time taken for negotiation and difficulties for banks to 
compromise. Potential risks are banks to withdraw from compromise and result in the 
companies being wound up. Another point for the importance of linking up with 
established banks is to reduce the risk of calling loans by banks that are themselves 
in financial troubles. Classic examples are recent problems faced by Japanese banks. 
• C u r r e n c y m a n a g e m e n t - hedging and matching currency of loans and deposits 
against anticipated trade receipts and payables in order to minimize currency risk 
exposures. 
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• I s s u e o f b o n d s - issue of convertible bonds is of increasing popularity as an alternate 
source of finance due to longer maturity period and more flexible arrangements. 
ln general, legacies of recent Asian turmoil are a series of chaos with soaring 
interest cost, capital tied up and shortage of ftind suffered by companies. The situations 
are further intensified by the decline in real consumption power and propensity to spend. 
Consequently, there are mounting pressures on tighten controls for listed companies in 
Hong Kong in order to remain competitive, to survive and to turn the gloom into boom. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Corporate failures are usually caused by series of interlocking mistakes along the 
operational and financial sides. Findings from this study are discouraging, as 85 
companies or around 17% of the second to fourth tier listed companies in Hong Kong 
under the Property Sector and Industries & Commerce Sector are poorly performed. 
Their operating results are astonishing both in terms of the size of losses and the trend of 
performance. 
Reasons for the initial success of these companies may be complicated, but 
reasons for their failures are rather unique. Major problems are over-expansion to both 
core and non-core businesses, especially for PRC exposures. It is ironic that the 
aggressive moves are partly triggered by huge influx of capital upon flotation, as well as 
the "enthusiastic supports" from the aggressive banks. Perhaps these are the stories about 
having the right money, but investing at the wrong time and in the wrong place. 
Nevertheless, the existing concerns for management are to look forward and to 
reposition the company under current economic downturn, to avoid the threats and to 
seize the opportunities for turnaround and survival. 
- E N D -
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